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Abstract 
Freeman (2006) suggested that auctioning immigration visas and redistributing the revenue to 
native residents in the host country would increase migration from low-income to high-
income countries. The effect of the auctioning of immigration visas, in the Ricardian model 
from Findlay (1982), on the optimal level of immigration for the host country is considered. 
It is shown that auctioning immigration visas will lead to a positive level of immigration only 
if the initial wage difference between the host country and the source country is substantial. 
The cost of the immigration visa is more than half the earnings of the immigrant worker. 
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1. Introduction 
In the world economy, there is almost free trade in goods as tariffs are generally low, 
and there are very few barriers to capital mobility. Of course, there are exceptions with some 
sectors such as agriculture still heavily protected, and the widespread use of anti-dumping 
regulations is a threat to world trade. However, as many commentators have observed, for 
example, Freeman (2006) and Hatton (2007), there are now significant barriers to labour 
migration especially from low-wage to high-wage countries, and these barriers do not seem to 
be falling. Freeman (2006) notes that the dispersion of wage rates between countries is much 
larger than the dispersion of the prices of goods or the cost of capital, which suggests that 
labour market integration, has not matched the integration of the goods market and the capital 
market in the world economy. The potential scale of labour migration, when the free 
movement of labour is permitted, can be seen from the United Kingdom experience after the 
European Union expanded from 15 to 25 countries in 2004.1 The UK, unlike most of the 
other EU member states, allowed unrestricted immigration from the new member states in 
eastern Europe. As a result, despite the government predicting that the number would be 
thirteen thousand, approximately half a million immigrants came to the UK from the new 
member states in eastern Europe especially Poland.2 
Although there are substantial benefits to the world economy from labour migration, 
these benefits accrue mainly to the migrant workers. As Hatton (2007) argues this makes it 
difficult to liberalise labour mobility by international negotiations, as there is little or no basis 
for reciprocity. This is because labour migration, which is driven by absolute advantage, 
flows from low-wage to high-wage countries unlike international trade where there is a two 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of the immigration policies of the EU member states, see Boeri and Brücker (2005). 
2 The UK did not continue with its liberal policy when Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007 
and the number of unskilled immigrants from these countries was limited to 20,000. 
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way flow of goods driven by comparative advantage. Freeman (2006) argues that because the 
benefits of migration accrue mainly to the migrant workers and since there may be losses for 
the host country then a ‘radically economic policy’ such as the auctioning of immigration 
visas may be required. The revenue from the auctioning of immigration visas could then be 
redistributed to the native residents of the host country to make immigration a welfare 
improving or politically acceptable policy for the host country. 
A model of labour migration where immigration has an undoubtedly negative effect 
on the welfare of native residents in the host country is the Ricardian model employed by 
Findlay (1982).3 In the Ricardian model, immigration expands the export industry in the host 
country thereby worsening its terms of trade and reducing the welfare of native residents.4 
Davis and Weinstein (2002) used an extension of the Ricardian model as the basis for their 
estimates of the effects of immigration on the United States and they claimed that the terms 
of trade loss amounted to $72billion or 0.8% of GDP for the USA. 
This paper will consider the effects of the auctioning of immigration visas in the 
Ricardian model of Findlay (1982) to assess whether the redistribution of the revenue from 
the auctioning of the immigration visas can offset the negative terms of trade thereby making 
immigration a welfare improving policy for the host country. 
 
2. The Ricardian Model 
The analysis uses the standard Ricardian model employed by Findlay (1982) in his 
article on migration. There are two countries (labelled A and B) with AL  ( BL ) native 
                                                 
3 Although, it should be stressed that Findlay (1982) used distributive justice to argue the case for free 
labour migration. 
4 As there is only one factor in the Ricardian model, there is no immigration surplus as in Borjas (1995) 
so the only effect on welfare is through the terms of trade. 
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worker/consumers in country A (B), each endowed with one unit of labour. By assumption, 
and without loss of generality, the wage in country A will be higher than in country B. The 
labour can be used to produce two goods that are labelled X and Y. Labour is perfectly mobile 
between these two industries, but initially it is assumed to be internationally immobile. In 
country A, the labour input requirement to produce one unit of good X is Xa  and to produce 
one unit of Y is Ya . Similarly, in country B, the labour input requirements are Xb  and Yb . 
Country A is assumed to have a comparative advantage in the production of good X; 
therefore, the opportunity cost of producing X is lower in country A than in country B so 
X Y X Ya a b b< . Findlay (1982) assumes that neither country has an absolute advantage in the 
production of both goods, but that assumption is not required here, as free labour migration 
will not be considered. 
The preferences of the worker/consumers are identical and homothetic in the two 
countries, and can be represented by the Cobb-Douglas utility function: 1A Bu u x y
γ γ−= =  
where ( )0,1γ ∈  is the proportion of income spent on good X. The price of good X is Xp  and 
the price of good Y is Yp . The wage in country A is Aw  and in country B is Bw  and each 
worker/consumer is endowed with one unit of labour. The income of a worker in country A is 
Am  and in country B is Bm . Therefore, the Marshallian demands of a worker/consumer in 
country A are DA A Xx m pγ=  and ( )1DA A Yy m pγ= − , and in country B are DB B Xx m pγ=  and 
( )1DB B Yy m pγ= − . Since preferences are identical and homothetic, the aggregate demands 
will be functions of total income so the aggregate demand for good X in country A is 
( )DA A A XX m L pγ=  and in country B is ( )DA B B XX m L pγ= . These demands have the Mill-
Graham property that a constant fraction of income γ  is spent on good X and 1 γ−  is spent 
on good Y. 
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Under free trade, assuming complete specialisation in production in both countries, 
since country A has a comparative advantage in the production of good X, it will produce 
S
A A XX L a=  units of good X while country B will produce SB B YY L b=  units of good Y. The 
wage in country A is given by the marginal product of labour in the X industry so 
A X Xw p a=  and the wage in country B is given by the marginal product of labour in the Y 
industry so B Y Yw p b= . For simplicity, normalise the price of good Y at unity so 1Yp =  
therefore the wage in country B is 1B Yw b= , which is a constant. Since each worker is 
endowed with one unit of labour, the income of a worker in country A is A Am w=  and in 
country B is B Bm w= . Therefore, since preferences are identical and homothetic, the world 
demand for good X is given by the aggregate demand function: ( )D A A B B XX w L w L pγ= +  
while the world supply of good X is given by the supply of country A: S SA A XX X L a= = . 
Equating demand and supply in the world market yields the equilibrium free trade price of 
good X: 
 
1
T X B
X
Y A
a L
p
b L
γ
γ= −  (1) 
For complete specialisation, the equilibrium free trade price must be between the 
autarky prices (opportunity costs) of the two countries so X Y X X Ya a p b b< < . This implies 
that for complete specialisation the labour endowment of country A relative to the labour 
endowment of country B must be in the range: 
 
1 1
X A Y
X B Y
a L a
b L b
γ γ
γ γ< <− −  (2) 
Since wages are equal to the marginal products of labour, the wage in country A 
relative to the wage in country B is: 
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 1
1
T
A X X B
B Y Y A
w p a L
w p b L
γ
γ
⎛ ⎞ = = >⎜ ⎟ −⎝ ⎠
 (3) 
This must be greater than one as country A is assumed, without loss of generality, to 
be the country with the higher wage, and this will be the case if ( )1A BL L γ γ< − . 
 
3. Immigration 
With restricted immigration, a limited number of workers can move from the low-
wage country B to the high-wage country A. As in Findlay (1982), when workers move to a 
country they acquire the productivity of the host country so immigrants from country B are 
just as productive as the native workers in country A. The number of workers in country A 
becomes AL  with the immigration of ( )A AL L−  workers while the number of workers in 
country B becomes BL  with the emigration of ( )B BL L−  workers, and the total labour force 
in the world is unchanged, A B A BL L L L+ = +  so ( ) ( )A A B BL L L L− = − . Since country A has a 
comparative advantage in the production of good X, the immigrant workers will work in the X 
industry thereby increasing the supply of good X in country A so SA A XX L a= . Assuming that 
the ( )A AL L−  immigration visas are allocated by country A without the immigrants workers 
having to pay for the visas then the income of an immigrant worker is the same as a native 
worker in country A so A Am w= . Therefore, since preferences are identical and homothetic, 
the world demand for good X is given by the aggregate demand function: 
( )D A A B B XX w L w L pγ= +  while the world supply of good X is given by the supply of 
country A: S SA A XX X L a= = . Equating demand and supply in the world market yields the 
equilibrium price and relative wage with immigration: 
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1
I X B
X
Y A
a L
p
b L
γ
γ= −  (4) 
Since wages are equal to the marginal products of labour, and immigration is 
restricted so wages are not equalised in the two countries, the relative wage and the wage 
difference between the two countries are: 
 
( )
( )1 01 1
I
A B AA B
A B
B A Y A
L L Lw L
w w
w L b L
γγ
γ γ
+ −⎛ ⎞ = > − = >⎜ ⎟ − −⎝ ⎠
 (5) 
Immigration increases the labour force in country A and decreases the labour force in 
country B by the same number of workers so 1B AdL dL = − . Thus, the effect of immigration 
on the equilibrium price and wage is is: 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
2
2
0
1
1
0
1
X A BX X X B
A A B A Y A
A BA X
A X A Y A
a L Ldp p p dL
dL L L dL b L
L Ldw dp
dL a dL b L
γ
γ
γ
γ
− +∂ ∂= + = <∂ ∂ −
− += = <−
 (6) 
An increase in immigration reduces the price of good X thereby worsening the terms 
of trade of country A that exports good X. It also reduces the wage in country A as the 
reduction in the price of good X reduces the marginal product of labour. 
The welfare of a native worker/consumer in country A can be represented using the 
indirect utility function: ( ),A A X Av v p m= . The effect of immigration on the welfare of a 
native worker/consumer in country A is obtained by differentiating the indirect utility 
function and using Roy’s identity: 
 
1A A A X
A A X X A
dv v w dp
dL m a p dL
γ⎛ ⎞∂= −⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠  (7) 
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Substituting (4), (5) and (6) into (7) yields the effect of immigration on a native 
worker/consumer: 
 
( )
2
1
0A BA A X A
A A X A A Y A
L Ldv v dp v
dL m a dL m b L
γγ +∂ − ∂= = − <∂ ∂  (8) 
Due to the negative terms of trade effect, the effect of immigration on the welfare of a 
native worker/consumer in country A is unambiguously negative. This is similar to the 
negative terms of trade effect with immiserizing growth in Bhagwati (1958). Therefore, for 
country A, concerned about the welfare of its native workers, the optimal level of 
immigration is zero. 
The welfare of a worker that remains in country B is given by the indirect utility 
function: ( ),B B X Bv v p m= . The effect of emigration of workers from country B to country A 
on the worker/consumers that remain in country B is obtained by differentiating the indirect 
utility function and using Roy’s identity: 
 
( )
0A BB B B X B
A X B A B Y A B
L Ldv w v dp v
dL p m dL m b L L
γγ +∂ ∂= = >∂ ∂  (9) 
The worker/consumers that remain in country B unambiguously gain from emigration 
due to the positive terms of trade effect. The migrant workers obviously gain as they are 
moving from the low-wage country to the high-wage country and they face the same prices in 
both countries. 
Since all worker/consumers have identical and homothetic preferences (and the 
marginal utility of income is identical since they all face the same prices) then world welfare 
can be measured as the sum of the utilities of all the worker/consumers. Hence, world welfare 
is A A B BW L v L v= + , and the effect of migration from country B to country A on world welfare 
is: 
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 0B A BA B A B A B
A A A B
dW dL dv dv
v v L L v v
dL dL dL dL
= + + + = − >  (10) 
Migration from the low-wage country B to the high-wage country A increases world 
welfare as the utility of a worker/consumer is higher in country A than in country B as 
A Bv v>  so there is an efficiency gain for the world. The terms of trade effects on the two 
countries cancel out to leave just the efficiency gain. As Findlay (1982) showed free labour 
migration that equalises wages in the two countries brings about a Pareto-efficient outcome 
for the world. 
 
4. Auctioning Immigration Visas 
Although free migration is Pareto-optimal for the world economy, the native workers 
in country A will lose from immigration, and if the government in country A maximises the 
welfare of the native residents then immigration will be prohibited. Freeman (2006) suggests 
that a ‘radically economic policy’ such as the auctioning of immigration visas is required so 
that the native workers in country A will receive some of the benefits from immigration. If 
country A auctions a number of immigration visas then the immigrant workers will be 
prepared to pay the amount of the wage difference between the two countries, A Bw w− . The 
revenue from the auction of the immigration visas could then be redistributed to the native 
workers in country A. With ( )A AL L−  immigrant workers each paying ( )A Bw w−  for an 
immigration visa, each native worker in country A would receive ( )( )A B A A Aw w L L L− −  so 
the income of each native worker is ( )( )A A A B A A Am w w w L L L= + − −  whereas each 
immigrant worker has the same income as a worker that remains in country B that is 
B Bm w= . This redistribution of income from the immigrant workers to the native workers in 
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country A does not affect the aggregate demands for the two goods since preferences are 
identical and homothetic. Therefore, the equilibrium prices and wages are unaffected and are 
given by (4) and (5). 
With the auctioning of immigration visas, the effect of immigration on the welfare of 
a native worker/consumer in country A is obtained by differentiating the indirect utility 
function and using Roy’s identity: 
 
1 1A A A X A A X A B
A A X X A A X A A
dv v m dp L L dp w w
dL m a p dL L a dL L
γ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞∂ − −= − + +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 (11) 
The first term in square brackets is the terms of trade effect of immigration, which is 
negative. The second term is the effect of immigration on the revenue from each immigration 
visa, ( )A Bw w− , which is negative as the reduction in the price of good X reduces the wage in 
country A. The third effect is the extra revenue from the marginal immigrant worker, which is 
positive provided the wage in country A is higher than the wage in country B. Substituting (4) 
(5) and (6) into (11) yields: 
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )
2
1
A B A A B A B A A A BA A
A A Y A A B
L L L L L L L L L L Ldv v
dL m b L L L
γ γ
γ
⎡ ⎤+ − + − + − −∂= ⎢ ⎥∂ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (12) 
The sign of the derivative depends upon the numerator of the expression in square 
brackets. First, consider the possibility of a corner solution where the optimal level of 
immigration is zero. This will be the case if the derivative is negative when evaluated at 
where there is no immigration so when A AL L=  and B BL L= . Then, the numerator in square 
brackets becomes ( ) 2A B B A BL L L L Lγ+ −  and this will be negative if: 
 ( )1 2,
1
T
A B
B A
w L
w L
γ γ
γ γ
⎛ ⎞ += < ∈ ∞⎜ ⎟ −⎝ ⎠
 (13) 
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When immigration visas are auctioned, immigration will only increase the welfare of 
the native worker/consumers in country A if the wage under free trade (when there is no 
immigration) is substantially higher in country A than in country B. For example, if 1 3γ = , 
then the optimal level of immigration will be zero even if the wage in country A is up to four-
times the wage in country B. This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: When immigration visas are auctioned, the optimal level of 
immigration is zero if ( ) ( ) ( )1 2,TA Bw w γ γ< + ∈ ∞ . 
Secondly, if the wage under free trade (when there is no immigration) is substantially 
higher in country A than in country B, ( ) ( )1TA Bw w γ γ> + , then the optimal level of 
immigration is positive. The relative wage at the optimum can be obtained by setting the 
derivative (12) equal to zero. Rearranging the numerator of the expression in square brackets, 
it can be shown that the relative wage at the optimum is: 
 
( )( ) ( )* 1 1 2,
1
A B A AA B
B A A B
L L L Lw L
w L L L
γ γ γ
γ γ γ
+ −⎛ ⎞ + += = + > ∈ ∞⎜ ⎟ −⎝ ⎠
 (14) 
The optimal level of immigration will be such that the wage difference between the 
two countries is still substantial. The cost of the immigration visa to the immigrant worker as 
a proportion of the wage in country A is: 
 ( )
*
1
2
1
,1
1
A B
A
w w
w γ
⎛ ⎞− > ∈⎜ ⎟ +⎝ ⎠
 (15) 
The immigrant worker has to pay at least half of the wage in country A for the 
immigration visa. For example, if 1 3γ = , then the relative wage at the optimal level of 
immigration will be greater than four, and the cost of the immigration visa will be more than 
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three-quarters of the earnings of the immigrant worker. These results lead to the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 2: When immigration visas are auctioned, if ( ) ( )1TA Bw w γ γ> + , then 
the relative wage at the optimal level of immigration will be: ( ) ( ) ( )* 1 2,A Bw w γ γ> + ∈ ∞ . 
When immigration visas are auctioned, the utility of a migrant worker will be the 
same as the utility of a worker that remains in country B since both have the same income and 
face the same prices. The effect of emigration on the welfare of a worker that remains in 
country B is still given by (9), since workers that remain in country B are unaffected by the 
auction of immigration visas. Therefore, when immigration occurs with auctioned 
immigration visas, it is a Pareto-improvement since the native workers in country A gain, the 
migrant workers gain and the workers that remain in country B gain. Hence, the auctioning of 
immigration visas has a beneficial effect when the wage difference between the two countries 
is substantial. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has considered the effects of the auctioning of immigration visas in the 
Ricardian model employed by Findlay (1982) to analyse migration. In the absence of the 
auctioning of immigration visas, the optimal level of immigration is zero for the host country. 
It was shown that when there is a substantial wage difference between the two countries then 
the auctioning of immigration visas will mean that a positive level of immigration is optimal 
for the host country. At the optimal level of immigration, the wage in the host country is at 
least twice the wage in the source country, and the cost of the immigration visa is equal to 
more than half the earnings of the immigrant workers. Immigration leads to a Pareto 
improvement since the native workers in the host country, the migrant workers and the 
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workers remaining in the source country all gain. Therefore, the auctioning of immigration 
visas has the beneficial effect on the level of immigration suggested by Freeman (2006). 
Clearly, when the wage difference between the two countries is substantial, the potential 
welfare gains from migration for the world economy will also be substantial. However, when 
the wage difference between the two countries is not substantial, the optimal level of 
immigration is zero for the host country and the auctioning of immigration visas has no 
effect. 
In other models, there may be potential benefits from immigration for the host 
country. For example, Collie (2007) adds external economies of scale to the Ricardian model 
so immigration has a positive productivity effect as well as a negative terms of trade effect. In 
such a model, the auctioning of immigration visas is more likely to be an effective policy for 
encouraging immigration than in the Ricardian model, which may be the toughest test for the 
suggested policy of Freeman (2006). 
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